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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the pattern of employment adjustment at the plant level using a rich
data set for Norway. We first document the stylized facts about employment changes in small
and large plants. The data reveals important differences across size classes. In particular,
episodes of zero net employment changes are more frequent for smaller plants. A simple “q”
model of labor demand is then developed, allowing for the presence of fixed, linear and
convex components in adjustment costs. Econometric estimation supports the importance of
departing from traditional models of labor demand based solely on symmetric convex
adjustment costs. Fixed (or linear) components of adjustment costs are important. There is,
moreover, evidence that fixed costs contain a component that are unrelated to size, in addition
to a components proportional to size. As a result, the range of inaction is wider for smaller
plants. Finally, the quadratic components of costs are asymmetric and, although some
ambiguities exist about the nature of the asymmetry, the more general models indicate that it is
more costly at the margin to contract employment than to expand it.
JEL classification: D21, C24, E24
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1. Introduction
In the last few years there has been an heightened awareness of the shortcomings of traditional
models of factor demand based on convex and symmetric adjustment costs and of the need to
consider more general adjustment cost functions (see Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) for a
critical review). The increased availability of firm and plant level panel data made it easier to
provide empirical evidence on these issues and has lead to a blossoming of empirical studies,
particularly on investment.
1 Recent contributions on labor demand are scarcer, although by no
mean absent.
2
In this paper we intend to advance our understanding of both net and gross employment
changes, using a rich data set on Norwegian plants that can also be matched with
administrative records on workers. Although labor protection is known to be strict in a
Scandinavian type of welfare state as Norway, its rank is about average among OECD
countries on the strictness of dismissal regulations for firms (OECD, 1999). Evidence on the
flexibility of the Norwegian economy from job and worker flows data suggests that it is about
average for OECD countries, although worker flows are a bit below average.
3
Two are the distinguishing features of our paper. First, we specify a simple optimizing
model of labor demand that allows for a fairly general structure of adjustment costs. In the
basic specification, such costs are function of net employment changes and include fixed,
linear and quadratic components. The model can be thought of as a q model for employment,
and like other models in this area, generates a region in which labor demand does not respond
to changes in fundamentals, because the gains from increasing or decreasing employment by
one unit is not large enough to compensate the incurring of adjustment costs. Moreover, the
response to fundamentals may differ for net employment increases versus decreases, reflecting
asymmetries in the quadratic component of adjustment costs.
Secondly, the adjustment costs are allowed to differ for small and large plants. One way
to model this is to allow for a truly fixed component in adjustment costs that makes the range
                                                
1 Among the most recent papers that analyze the importance of non convexities and irreversibility in generating
non smooth investment patterns see Doms and Dunne (1998), Goolsbee and Gross (1997), Barnett and Sakellaris
(1998), Abel and Eberly (1999), Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999), Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2000), Letterie
and Pfann (2000)
2 See, the seminal contributions by Hamermesh (1989a, 1989b, 1992), and the more recent ones by Rota (1995),
Abowd and Kramarz (1997), Campbell and Fisher (2000a,b), and Goux, Maurin and Pauchet (2001).
3 See Salvanes (1997) and Salvanes and Førre (2001).2
of inaction wider for smaller plants (firms). Indeed larger plants are more likely to have
personal and planning departments that are set up for with dealing with employment changes
and they may experience less disruption to production when such changes occur. As a result,
the range of the value of fundamentals for which there are no employment changes is wider for
smaller plants (firms). 
4
Although in this version of the paper we specify adjustment costs as a function of net
employment changes, the model can be extended to allow for adjustment costs that are a
function of gross hiring or firing. Moreover, since the plant level data can be linked to
individual records, we can reconstruct gross hiring. Unfortunately gross separation cannot be
distinguished according to their cause. In future work, we will therefore be able to estimate
models for gross hiring, based on the assumption that adjustment costs depend upon gross and
not net flows. Finally, we plan to use more extensively the possibility of matching individual
and plant level data in order to break down employment according to workers’ characteristics,
such as education and length of tenure, that are likely to affect adjustment patterns. 
5
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start by presenting in Section 2 some
descriptive evidence on employment adjustment patterns and gross hiring. The data reveals
interesting differences across plants of different size. In Section 3 we describe in details the
Norwegian institutions regulating the adjustment of the labor factor. Section 4 contains the
theoretical model that underpins our econometric estimation. In Section 5 we present
econometric estimates of various versions of the model for plants in the metal product and
machinery sector (excluding large-construction and ship-building industry) over the period
1986-1995. This sector contains a large number of plants of different size and with different
employment histories. Concentrating on a single industry keeps the problem of matching plant
and individual level observations manageable and reduces heterogeneity problems in
estimation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
                                                
4 The structure of adjustment costs has important implications for the way in which productivity gains are
achieved in an economy. For instance, Haltiwanger, Krizan and Foster (1999) find that reallocation of labor
between heterogeneous firms within narrowly defined sectors are very important in explaining productivity gains
in the US economy. The size distribution of establishments and their respective adjustment costs will have
important implications on how economies respond to shocks.
5 So far very little is known about the relative importance of gross versus net flows. One important exception is
Hamermesh (1995), using a small data set for US firms. For empirical models based on adjustment costs defined
on gross flows see Abowd and Kramarz (1997) who use 1992 data for French establishments.3
2. Data and Descriptive Evidence
2.1. The Data
Our empirical work is based on yearly plant level information for the period 1986-1995
contained in Manufacturing Statistics including production, sales, employment, production
costs, the age of the plant, whether the plant belongs to a multi-plant or single plant firm.
Investment and capital stock information is also is available (see Halvorsen, Jensen and Foyn
(1991)). Total sales are calculated by adding sales of produced goods and traded goods, income
from repairs and contracted works, income from leasing and deliveries to other plants in same
firm. We restrict our attention to plants with an average size of at least five employees, since
plant or firm specific information is not available for plants below five employees. We have
excluded all auxiliary units which do not take part of the production directly (separate storage
and office units). Plants in which the central or local governments own more than 50 percent of
the equity have been excluded from the sample, as well as observations that are reported as
“copied from previous year”. This actually means missing data. In this paper we focus on
plants in the metal products and machinery industries (ISIC 38), excluding large-construction
and ship-building industry. Concentrating on a single industry reduces the heterogeneity
problem in estimation and keeps the problem of matching plant and individual level
observations manageable. Moreover, sector 38 is important and rather large, accounting for
35% of manufacturing employment in 1990.
The remaining data set was trimmed to remove outliers. To avoid measurement errors
in the employment changes, observations where the total employment level was 3 times larger
than, or less than 1/3 of the employment level for the previous year were dropped. Finally, we
included only series with at least four consecutive observations implying also that exits and
new entries of plants were excluded. The final unbalanced panel contains 1414 production
plants with a total of 10681 observations (an unbalanced panel).
The plant level data can be matched with administrative individual information. In the
administrative registers, individuals are identified by their social security number. In the
second quarter each year every worker is matched to the individual’s main employer. The
starting and terminal dates of each matched employer-employee contract are given. Up to now
we have used such information to reconstruct gross job flows. However in the future we plan
to use also individual information on education, age, tenure etc. to analyze how adjustment
patterns differ across heterogeneous workers.4
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
What are the basic patterns of employment changes for our sample of Norwegian plants? We
summarize the basic characteristics of the distribution of net employment changes in Table 1
and in Figure 1. Over the period 1986-1995, there is a large degree of heterogeneity in the
patterns of employment changes. Employment increases and decreases occur equally
frequently: approximately 40% of the observations represent positive employment changes
while 40% correspond to employment decreases. Interestingly in 20% of cases we observe no
employment changes. This may be suggestive of the fact that changing the number of jobs
even by a small amount may imply sizeable adjustment costs that deter firms from adjusting.
This would be the case for instance, in the presence of fixed or linear components of
adjustment costs. If the firm increases the work force the more frequent changes occur in the
interval (0, +20%). This occurs 65% of the times (conditionally on the firm expanding) and
represents a 49% share of total employment increases. Similarly, if the firm contracts,
decreases in the interval (-20%, 0) occur most frequently (65% of the times) and they represent
a share of 51% of total employment changes. However plants experience frequently also
changes in excess of 20%, particularly for employment increases.
The pattern of adjustment differs in at least one important way across plants of different
sizes: the frequency of episodes characterized by no employment changes decreases with size.
The frequency of zero episodes is approximately 27% for plants of 25 workers or less, 10% for
plants of 25-50 workers, 5% for plants of 51-100 workers and 3% for plants larger than 100
workers. Several reasons can be listed why there is a connection between plant size and
adjustment costs. One possible explanation may be that the fixed component of adjustment
costs is relatively more important for smaller plants. For instance, smaller plants are less likely
to belong to a firm with a personal department used to handle expansions or contraction of the
workforce. In general, reorganizations and definition of work assignments may involve fixed
components of cost that are more difficult to absorb for a small plant. For the very smallest of
plants there may also be an element of indivisibility, that generates consequences that are
observationally equivalent to those of fixed costs. Indivisibility becomes, however, a less
plausible explanation for plants of more than 25 workers, some of which continue to display
significant occurrences of zero employment changes episodes.
In Table 2 we report the salient characteristics of gross hirings. Slightly more than half
of the observations is accounted for hiring rates in the range (10%, 30%). Also in these cases
zero hiring episodes are important and represent 22% of the observations. This frequency5
decreases with firm size, just as in the case of net hiring. It is interesting to note that in the
majority of observations in which net employment does not change, some gross hiring take
place, presumably to replace workers that have left the firm. Similar findings are described by
Abowd, Corbel and Kramarz (1999). Gross hiring occurs in 56% of the cases where the
employment is stable from one year to another. This suggests that there are costs specific with
changing the size of the workforce that are independent from the search and training costs, and
the like, that are related to the identity of the worker filling a job.
3. Institutional setting
The costs of changing both the plant size and especially the workers filling the jobs, is of
course affected by the institutional setting and legislation introduced to protect workers against
unfair dismissal. The institutional setting varies over countries and potentially over time. In
this section, we provide some information on the Norwegian policies and institutions that
affect the costs of adjusting labor demand, and make comparisons to other OECD countries.
Both the rules regarding individual and collective dismissals, and the flexibility of
plants with respect to temporary hiring and the use of subcontractors, are important in
explaining the costs of adjustment for plants. The different types of constraints regulating the
hiring and firing of workers are not completely transparent, since, in addition to national laws,
collective agreements between employer and workers organization also are very important in
regulating the adjustment of the labor factor. These agreements may differ across industries
industries and workers, depending upon age, tenure, etc.
One of the most important pieces of national regulation is contained in a law from
1982, “Arbeidsmiljøloven”, which includes standards for the general working conditions,
overtime regulations and legal regulation for employment protection. Dismissals for personal
reasons are limited to cases of disloyalty, persistent absenteeism etc., while dismissals for
economic reasons are automatically unfair. In general it is possible but very difficult to replace
an individual worker in a given job with another worker. The general rule for laying off a
worker for economic reasons is that it can be done only when the job is "redundant" and the
worker cannot be retained in another capacity. This regulation covers all workers independent
of how long he/she has been hired. In general, there is a strong degree of employment
protection in Norway. According to the legal regulation, employment is terminable by one
month’s notice in Norway, and this one-month notice is at the lower end of the spectrum6
compared to many countries. This rule is basically for tenure periods up to 5 years. However,
most workers have a three months’ notice requirement for both parties of the contract. There is
no generalized legal requirement of severance pay in Norway, but agreements in the private
sector require lump-sum payments to workers who have reached the age 50-55. As an example,
in the contract between LO (the largest blue collar workers organization) and NHO (the
employers’ association), the worker must be 50 and been working for 10 consecutive years or
20 years in the firms in order to be eligible for one to two months pay. Comparable agreements
exist for the other unions. Thus, the severance payment is low in Norway compared to other
countries. In comparison with other OECD countries, Norway scores generally high on
employment protection together with Japan and Portugal (OECD, 1999).
Requirements for collective dismissals in Norway, basically follows the minimum rules
for EU-countries. Many EU-countries actually have stronger rules than the minimum including
also general compensation, a social plan for re-training or transfer to another plant within a
firm for instance. Although not mandatory, some of these other requirements have been used
also in Norway. For this set of dismissal restriction, Norway is ranked below average among
OECD countries.
The work force flexibility of an economy can be enhanced by allowing fixed-term
contracts in addition to standard contract, and the use of temporary work agencies. In many
OECD countries there has been a strong trend in liberalizing the use of these two schemes. In
Norway, the use of fixed term contracts is allowed only for limited situations, such as specific
projects, seasonal work or the replacement of workers who are absent temporary. Some
exceptions from this rule exist, for example for chief executives and researchers. However, it
may not necessarily as restrictive as it appears since defining a specific project for a firm is
partly open discretion. Large scale projects for a firm is often defined as a specific project and
not defined as part of the standard activity of the firm. Hence, workers employed by the project
work under fixed-term contracts. Successive contracts are possible with some limitations, and
there is in general no rule of limiting the cumulated duration of successive contract. In general
the use of temporary work agencies are prohibited, but wide exceptions exists for service
sector occupations. Restrictions for the number of renewals exist, and 2 years is the maximum
for cumulated contracts. Compared to other OECD countries, Norway is ranked a little bit
above average for the strictness of the use of temporary employment (OECD, 1999).
Very few comparative studies of the overall degree of employment protection exist. A
much-sited study by Emerson (1987), ranks Italy as having the strongest employment7
protection rules while the UK and partly Denmark are at the other end of the spectrum. Norway
is ranked together with Sweden, France and partly Germany, when all regulations taken
together as an intermediate country with a fairly high degree of protection. Obviously inter-
country comparisons are difficult, however also Rogstad (1990) finds that employment
protection is stronger in for instance Norway and France as compared to for instance the UK
and Denmark. The most recent comparison is made by OECD in 1999, where Norway is
ranked as number 12 of 19 OECD countries for the late 1980s, and as number 19 of 26 OECD
countries for the late 1990s. The difference is the liberalization of the use of temporary
contracts in many countries in the 1990s.
4. A simple “q” model for employment.
In this section we develop a model for employment demand that allows for a general structure
of adjustment costs. The model is similar in spirit to q models of investment in the presence of
fixed adjustment costs and irreversibilities (see Abel and Eberly (1994) and (1999)). It is also
related to the model in Hamermesh (1992) that also contains fixed and quadratic components
of adjustment costs.
6 We will show that when firms expand or contract, the growth rate of
employment is related to the shadow value of the marginal worker, q, defined as the present
discounted value of the marginal product of labor, net of wage costs. Our strategy is to use
simple approximations to q and to estimate various versions of the model that differ in the
precise specification of adjustment costs and of the stochastic elements of the model.
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where t L  denotes employment, ) ( t L F  the gross production function,  ) , ( 1 − ∆ t t L L G  adjustment
costs, assumed to be a function of net employment changes, and  t w the wage rate. We omit the
index i for each firm for notational simplicity. Similarly, although capital is not introduced
explicitly in the problem for ease of notation, firms should be thought as using both capital and
                                                
6 See also the other seminal contributions by Hamermesh (1989a), (1989b).8
labor. However, capital is either not costly to adjust, or, if it is, its adjustment costs are
additively separable from those for labor (there are no interrelated adjustment costs).
Adjustment costs contain fixed, linear and quadratic components. Fixed costs, in turn, contain
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For employment to expand, it must be true that the marginal profits generated by the expansion
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t q  represents therefore the present discounted value of the marginal product of capital, net of
adjustment costs, minus the flow of wage costs associated to the marginal worker. In order to
make the model estimable, we need to approximate the shadow value of a worker. We will
assume that the latter is proportional to the sales to labor ratio. This could be justified if the
production function is Cobb Douglas in labor and capital.
7 Moreover we assume that firms use
simple AR(2) processes to forecast the sales to labor ratio and the wage rate. Finally, if we
assume that the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to  t L , given net hiring,  t L ∆ ,
denoted by  L G  is dominated by the other two terms on the right hand side of (5), (i.e. that
() (.) (.) ' L G w F ⋅ >> − β  ), we can write:
t t t Z q ε γ γ − + = ' 1 0  (6)
where  [] 1 1 , , ) / ( , ) / ( − − − − − − = τ τ τ τ t t t t t w w L S L S Z  and τ equals zero or one depending on whether
contemporaneous information on the wage and sales to labor ratio is available or not.
8 Note we
have added an error term  t ε  to the definition of the shadow value of a worker to capture all
those idiosyncratic factors at the firm level that are not observable by the econometrician. We




                                                
7 Imperfect competition can also be allowed for, provided the markup is constant.
8 In the current version of the paper we use τ  = 0 and τ  = 1. Thus, we assume that
[] 1 1 , , ) / ( , ) / ( − − = t t t t t w w L S L S Z  or  [] 2 1 2 1 , , ) / ( , ) / ( − − − − = t t t t t w w L S L S Z10
One last simplification is useful in taking the model to the data when  0 a  is non-zero, in
order to keep the non-linearity of the problem manageable in estimation. We will take a first






















              (4’’’)

















































































































σ ψ σ ψ
γ ψ























where  ] [ 0
+ + + − = b h γ ψ ,  ] [ 0
− − − + = b h γ ψ ,  ) ( 0 0 0 γ − =
+ + g d , and  ) ( 0 0 0 γ + =
− − g d , in
addition to that    
− + 0
, , denotes summation over the observations with respectively
positive, negative or zero employment changes. This is a sort of two-sided generalized Tobit
model. Note that the coefficients can be identified only up to the scale parameter  11 σ . However
we can identify the ratio of the quadratic adjustment costs parameters in the employment
increase and decrease regimes. Moreover the components of fixed costs 
+
0 g  and 
−
0 g  cannot be
identified separately from the constant in the definition of  t q . However their sum can be
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identified, which allows us to identify the fixed component as well, if we assume that it is the
same for employment increases and decreases.
10
Parameters estimates can be obtained by maximizing the likelihood function in
equation (7). Alternatively a Heckman type two step estimator can be used. First one estimates
the ordered probit models to obtain the determinants of the shadow value of employment. The
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(8)
where  (). Φ  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. This allows us to
recover estimates of the coefficients in (8) (relative to  11 σ ). These estimates can be used to
construct a proxy for  it q  and of the expected value of the error terms in the employment
change equations, conditional on the probability of being in an employment increase or
employment decrease regime. One can then estimate the following two equations:
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for employment increases and:
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10 Note that in writing the likelihood, we are using the information on which regime the firm is in (positive
employment changes, negative employment changes, no changes). The model estimated in Hamermesh (1989) is
instead an unobservable regime model, basically because it is assumed that when firms want to keep employment
constant, they succeed only on average (since there is a mean zero error term in the do nothing equation).12
+
it η and 
−
it η denote zero means error terms, while 
+
it λ  and 
−
it λ  denote the appropriate inverse
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where  (.) φ  denotes the standard normal density function. Equations (9) and (9’) can be
estimated by OLS after replacing  11 1' σ γ , 
+
it λ  and 
−
it λ  with the values constructed using the
estimates obtained using the in the ordered probit model. Note again that on can only obtain
estimates of  11 σ ψ
−  and  11 σ ψ
+ , and not of 
− ψ  and 
+ ψ . Under the assumption that the
variables in  it Z  are uncorrelated with  it ε , the ordered probit yields consistent estimates of the
coefficients and of their standard errors. OLS estimation of (9) and (9') yields consistent
estimates of the parameters, but not of their standards errors, because of the well-known
generated regressor problem. However, since there is only one generated regressor in each
































respectively,  the  t-
statistics to test the hypothesis that its coefficient is zero is valid (see Pagan (1994)).
11
A more general stochastic specification of the model would allow for an additional
optimization error in the employment expansion equation, 
+
it ν , and in the employment
contraction equation, 
−
it ν . The composite error term in such equations would then become
it it it u ε ψ ν
+ + − = 1 , and  it it it u ε ψ ν
− − − = 1 . We will assume that  it it it u u ε , , 2 1  are jointly normally
distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ  equal to:
                                                
11 The values obtained in the two step estimator can be used as starting values in the Maximum Likelihood
iterations. Note that one iteration of Newton-Raphson type of algorithm, yields an estimator that is asymptotically
























































































































































































































































































For this model as well one could easily write down the appropriate two step estimator.
5. Results
In this section we will report estimation result for the model summarized by (3), (3’), (4’’),
(4’’’) and (5), i.e. the model whose only stochastic element  it ε  is the error term in the
expression for the shadow value of labor  it q . We first present estimates based on Maximum
Likelihood estimation of the Ordered Probit in (8) and OLS estimation of (9) and (9'). We then
present the full Maximum Likelihood estimates of equation (7).
We have estimated various versions of the model with different specifications of the
fixed components of adjustment costs, and based on different assumptions about the
information set used by firms in forecasting the present value of returns to one additional14
worker. The results obtained when contemporaneous and once lagged sales and wages are used
to construct qt  are reported in Table 3. Initially we have assumed that the purely fixed
components 
+
0 a  and 
−
0 a  equal zero, so that the probability of increasing, decreasing or keeping
employment the same does not depend upon plant size, measured by past employment
( 0 1 1 = =
− + g g ). Results are reported in the first column. Note that a ~ above a parameter
denotes the ratio between the original parameter and  11 σ  (for instance,  11 0 0
~ σ
+ + = d d , etc.).
Moreover,  11 σ ψ δ
+ + =  and  11 σ ψ δ
− − = .
In the second column we allow 
+
0 a  and 
−
0 a , and hence 
+
0 a  and 
−
0 a , to differ from zero.
Since size does not enter in the equation for net employment changes, but it enters the
thresholds, we have now a useful exclusion restriction that can help us identifying the
employment changes equations when we estimate them using a Heckman type of procedure.
12
In column three again we set 
+
1 ~ g  and 
−
1 ~ g  to zero, but we assume that the fixed components of
adjustment costs that are proportional to size (
+
1 a  and 
−
1 a ) or the linear component in the
change in employment (b
+ and b
-) differ between small and large plants. Small (large) plants
are defined as those with less than (more than) 50 employees. In this model, therefore, the
thresholds vary discretely with size, contrary to the model in the second column where size
affects the thresholds continuously.
13 Size dummies are also included in the employment
equations. Finally, in the last column we present the more general model with both 
+
0 a  and 
−
0 a
different from zero and 
+
1 a  and 
−
1 a  that differ between small and large plants.
The Ordered Probit results suggest that there are significant fixed components of
adjustment costs or important linear components (in the change of employment). Their sum
(i.e. ( ) ( ) 11 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 / ~   and   / ~     where , ~ ~ σ γ σ γ − = + = +
+ + − − − + g d g d d d ) equals 0.554 (=-0.015+0.569)
and it is significantly different from zero. If the fixed component was symmetric, its value
would equal 0.277). The sign of the coefficients of the sales to labor ratio and of the wage rate
are sensible. The coefficient of () it L S  is positive significant and much larger (in absolute
value) than the negative coefficient of () 1 − it L S . The coefficient of the contemporaneous wage
is negative and significant, while the lagged wage has a very small and insignificant
                                                
12 See Lewbel (2001) for a semiparametric estimator of the second stage equation that relies on this exclusion
restriction, with an application to investment.
13 In future work we will also allow adjustment costs to differ between multi-plants and single plant firms.15
coefficient. This means that, looking at the sum of the coefficients on the contemporaneous
and lagged determinants of  it q , the sales to labor ratio has a positive effect and the wage a
negative effect on the shadow value of labor  it q , as one would expect. As a result, a
(permanently) higher sales to labor ratio is associated with an increase in the probability of
observing an increase in employment, while a (permanently) higher wage is associated with a
decrease in such probability. The opposite holds true for the probability of employment
decreases. The average estimated probability of the employment expansion, employment
contraction, and no change equal 0.384, 0.408 and 0.208 respectively. These figures make
sense, given the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1.
The results in the first column also suggest that there are significant quadratic
components of adjustment costs both in the case of employment expansion and employment
contraction. The coefficient in the employment expansion equation is δ
+ = 0.193 and the one in
the employment contraction regime is δ
- = 0.404, which would suggest that the coefficient of
the quadratic component is approximately twice as large for employment expansions compared
to employment contractions (expansions are more expensive at the margin). One can easily
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient of the quadratic component is equal in the two
regimes.
 When we allow for the inverse of plant size to affect continuously the thresholds, the
results suggest that 
+
1 ~ g  and 
−
1 ~ g  are significantly different from zero (see the second column of
Table 3). This suggests that plant size matters in determining the threshold values of  it q
beyond which the firm decides to increase or decrease employment. The range over which
plants keep employment constant is wider for plants with smaller initial employment, because
both the lower threshold decreases and the upper threshold increases. The effect of size is
much larger on the lower threshold, which means that smaller plants face greater fixed
adjustment costs particularly when they reduce employment. These overall econometric results
seem to be very much consistent with the descriptive evidence discussed in Section 2, and in
particular, with the larger frequency of zero employment changes episodes for smaller firms.
Note that now the sum of the estimated values of 
+
1
~ d  and 
−
1
~ d  is much smaller than before
(0.024 (=0.608-0.584) versus 0.554), indicating that the fixed component of cost proportional
to size and the component linear in employment changes are not as important when we allow
for a pure fixed component.16
Finally, also in this specification the quadratic components of costs remain important,
and different in expansions and contraction. However, the nature of the asymmetry is
completely different. The estimated value of  11 σ ψ δ + + =  and of  11 σ ψ δ − − = equal 0.224
and 0.154 respectively. Now the quadratic components of cost suggest that reductions in the
labor force are more expensive at the margin then increases in the labor force, which is exactly
the opposite of the results obtained with the more restrictive model presented in column 1.
Both quadratic coefficients are significantly different from zero and from each other.
In the third column of Table 3 we set 
+
1 ~ g  and 
−
1 ~ g equal to zero again, but allow size to
affect 
− +
0 0 d    and   d  discretely. Again we obtain that it is less costly to adjust for large plants, so
that the probability of observing zero employment changes episodes is smaller for them. The
quadratic coefficients again suggest that downward adjustments in employment are less costly
at the margin than employment expansions. However, when we allow both for size dummies
and for non zero
+
1 ~ g  and 
−
1 ~ g (results reported in column 4), we conclude that employment
expansions are less expensive than contractions at the margin. Given the presence of a useful
exclusion restriction when size is allowed to affect the thresholds, and given the significance of
−
1 ~ g in all specifications and the near significance of 
+
1 ~ g , the models allowing for a purely fixed
component of adjustment costs represent a more satisfactory specification, leading one to have
more faith in the conclusion that the marginal adjustment costs of employment decreases
exceed those associated with employment increases.
In the lower half of Table 3 we report the Maximum Likelihood estimates of the
various versions of the model. The estimation results are in part disappointing: while some of
the parameters are well determined some are not. In particular, the threshold parameters
− +
0 0
~   ,   ~ d   d ,
+
1 ~ g  and 
−
1 ~ g result difficult to estimate precisely. Moreover, the point estimates imply
unreasonable values of the estimated probabilities of each regime. For instance, the estimated
probability of the inaction regime is very close to one, while the ones for the employment
expansion and contraction regimes are very close to zero. One conjecture is that in the full
likelihood model, the thresholds parameters are basically pinned down only by the zero
observations (see equation (8)), while in the Ordered Probit Model the positive and negative
employment changes observations contribute to their determination. This makes it possible in
our sample to estimate those parameters more precisely using the Ordered Probit model. Note
however, that all the other parameters, such as those entering in the equation for the shadow17
value of employment and those determining the quadratic components of adjustment cost, are
well determined. As before, contemporaneous sales enter with a positive coefficient, while
lagged sales with a much smaller negative coefficient. The coefficient of contemporaneous
wages is negative, while the one for lagged wages is positive, but much smaller. All of them
are significantly different from zero. Finally, now in all specifications we obtain the result that,
at the margin, it is more expensive to contract employment than to expand it.
Table 4 mirrors Table 3 and contains the results obtained when only lagged information
is used in forming a proxy for the shadow value of employment. This reduces the potential
endogeneity problems due to the correlation between contemporaneous sales and possibly
wages and the error term. Most of the previous conclusions still hold. One exception is that the
coefficient of wages lagged once is now negative and significant, while the one for wages
lagged twice is positive and significant. The value of the latter exceeds the absolute value of
the former, which is less than satisfactory, since it implies a positive steady state effect of
wages on the shadow value of employment. Sales continue to play the role implied by the
results of Table 3. The purely fixed components of adjustment costs appear again to be
important, so that the area of inaction is greater for smaller plants. The ambiguities concerning
the asymmetries in the quadratic components of adjustment costs reappear here, but, as before,
the cost of reduction in employment is greater in the more general models, containing also a
purely fixed component of adjustment costs. The problem of estimating the threshold
parameters with Maximum Likelihood is confirmed.
6. Conclusions
 
It would be premature, a this stage, to reach definitive conclusions. However, the initial results
we have presented suggest that the framework proposed in this paper is potentially a fruitful
one. In particular, the q model of employment with a general specification of adjustment costs,
seems to be a useful way to organize the analysis of employment changes at the firm level. The
initial results imply that it is important to depart from the standard specification of convex and
symmetric adjustment costs. Fixed (or linear) costs are important factors that the firm must
consider when changing its employment levels. The evidence suggests that the fixed
components are relatively larger for smaller plants (with size measured by past employment).
This is partly because fixed costs contain a component that are unrelated to size, in addition to
a components proportional to size. As a result, the area of inaction is greater for smaller plants.18
Quadratic components of costs are also important, and although some ambiguities exist on the
nature of the asymmetries, the evidence from the more general models suggests that those costs
are higher during employment contractions compared to expansions.19
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(overall) (<0,>0) ∆∆∆∆ L/sum(∆∆∆∆ L) 4-25 26-50 51-100 101-
< -0.5 51 0.006 0.014 0.048 0.46 0.64 1.14 0.40
-0.5, -0.4 89 0.010 0.024 0.099 0.83 1.13 1.14 1.47
-0.4, -0.3 211 0.023 0.058 0.104 2.67 1.35 1.55 1.74
-0.3, -0.2 563 0.061 0.154 0.232 6.56 4.96 5.57 4.81
-0.2, -0.1 1332 0.144 0.364 0.314 14.95 13.76 11.76 14.15
-0.1, 0.0 1413 0.152 0.386 0.204 8.39 24.26 31.68 33.24
= 0 1886 0.204 - - 27.45 9.72 4.54 2.67
0.0, 0.1 1192 0.129 0.320 0.214 7.09 22.41 24.87 26.70
0.1, 0.2 1222 0.132 0.328 0.283 14.06 12.84 10.42 10.28
0.2, 0.3 601 0.065 0.161 0.158 7.97 3.90 3.92 2.54
0.3, 0.4 251 0.027 0.067 0.099 3.16 2.34 1.65 1.07
0.4, 0.5 220 0.024 0.059 0.074 3.21 0.99 0.62 0.40
0.5, 1.0 210 0.023 0.056 0.132 2.92 1.49 0.62 0.53
>1.0 26 0.003 0.007 0.041 0.29 0.21 0.52 0.00
Total 9267 1.000 3.000 3.000 #obs = #obs = #obs = #obs =
6139 1410 969 74922


















= 0 2047 0.221 0.000 30.18 10.21 4.13 1.34
0.0, 0.1 1955 0.211 0.163 10.96 31.77 45.10 53.00
0.1, 0.2 2410 0.260 0.288 24.30 30.00 28.38 29.37
0.2, 0.3 1328 0.143 0.229 15.10 14.04 12.38 11.08
0.3, 0.4 593 0.064 0.113 6.65 8.16 4.95 2.94
0.4, 0.5 458 0.049 0.068 6.39 2.41 2.58 0.93
0.5, 0.6 117 0.013 0.037 1.47 0.92 0.93 0.67
0.6, 0.7 135 0.015 0.026 1.92 0.71 0.41 0.40
0.7, 0.8 56 0.006 0.012 0.80 0.43 0.00 0.13
0.8, 0.9 64 0.007 0.018 0.94 0.28 0.10 0.13
0.9, 1.0 44 0.005 0.015 0.57 0.50 0.21 0.00
>1.0 60 0.006 0.032 0.72 0.57 0.83 0.00
Total 9267 1.000 1.000 #obs = #obs = #obs = #obs =
6139 1410 969 749
NJCR < 0 NJCR == 0 NJCR > 0
HR==0 1214 833 0
HR > 0 2445 1053 372223












































Table 3: Estimation Results for the Net Job Change Model
Coeff.z - v a lue Coeff.z - v a lue Coeff.z - v a lue Coeff.z - v a lue
Ordered probit results
(S/K)it 0.192 20.99 0.193 20.78 0.195 21.17 0.193 20.78
(S/K)it-1 -0.084 -9.47 -0.079 -8.78 -0.082 -9.22 -0.079 -8.78
w it -0.189 -2.98 -0.146 -2.29 -0.181 -2.87 -0.147 -2.31
w it-1 0.047 0.75 0.053 0.84 0.049 0.78 0.053 0.84
d tilde - -0.015 -0.28 -0.584 -9.70 0.058 1.08 -0.554 -8.57
d tilde + 0.569 10.59 0.608 10.10 0.605 11.17 0.605 9.41
g tilde - 6.698 24.07 6.423 18.79
g tilde + 0.604 2.32 0.608 1.93
probit big - -0.539 -14.30 -0.050 -1.10
probit big + -0.032 -0.84 0.017 0.38
Log L -8005.2 -7453.0 -7763.1 -7451.8
Estimated probabilities
Contraction 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.408
Zero changes 0.208 0.209 0.208 0.210
Expansion 0.384 0.383 0.384 0.383
OLS w/ inverse Mills ratios
Contraction
delta - 0.404 18.13 0.154 19.43 0.358 17.09 0.168 16.69
empl. big - -0.089 -10.06 -0.012 -2.17
h tilde -  0.150 9.08 -0.054 -10.52 0.122 7.37 -0.043 -5.89
Expansion
delta + 0.193 9.65 0.224 11.82 0.198 10.46 0.221 11.97
empl. big + -0.102 -11.83 -0.102 -11.96
h tilde +  -0.060 -2.25 -0.120 -4.45 -0.052 -2.03 -0.096 -3.65
Maximum likelihood
(S/K)it 0.122 15.14 0.122 15.19 0.123 15.29 0.123 15.28
(S/K)it-1 -0.050 -6.26 -0.050 -6.29 -0.048 -6.00 -0.048 -6.00
w it -0.301 -5.08 -0.300 -5.07 -0.301 -5.07 -0.302 -5.09
w it-1 0.134 2.24 0.135 2.25 0.124 2.07 0.123 2.05
d tilde - 4.339 1.95 3.677 1.13 4.413 1.68 4.043 0.66
d tilde - 4.734 2.10 4.257 1.38 4.509 2.97 4.840 0.93
h tilde -  -0.151 -26.55 -0.151 -26.59 -0.160 -28.32 -0.160 -28.29
h tilde +  0.163 15.55 0.162 15.47 0.185 17.85 0.186 17.91
g tilde - 6.764 0.14 4.530 0.06
g tilde + 4.197 0.10 0.981 0.02
probit big -1 . 6 1 2 0.01 0.351 0.02
probit big + 0.579 0.02 -0.014 0.00
empl. big - 0.039 8.95 0.039 8.95
empl. big + -0.109 -12.73 -0.109 -12.73
delta - 0.107 80.29 0.107 80.47 0.106 80.48 0.106 80.43
delta + 0.192 78.26 0.192 78.35 0.187 78.34 0.187 78.30
Log L 3307.6 3307.6 3426.8 3426.8
Number of obs 7853 7853 7853 785325
Table 4: Estimation Results for the Net Job Change Model (lagged infomation)
Coeff.z - v a lue Coeff.z - v a lue Coeff.z - v a lue Coeff.z - v a lue
Ordered probit results
(S/K)it-1 0.120 12.35 0.124 12.60 0.122 12.53 0.124 12.59
(S/K)it-2 -0.076 -7.98 -0.074 -7.65 -0.075 -7.78 -0.074 -7.65
w it-1 -0.121 -1.76 -0.082 -1.18 -0.117 -1.70 -0.082 -1.18
w it-2 0.199 2.83 0.205 2.90 0.199 2.84 0.205 2.90
d tilde - -0.023 -0.40 -0.579 -8.72 0.050 0.84 -0.576 -8.08
d tilde + 0.557 9.42 0.598 9.02 0.590 9.90 0.605 8.55
g tilde - 6.559 21.49 6.519 17.25
g tilde + 0.573 2.00 0.512 1.47
probit big - -0.494 -12.08 -0.001 -0.03
probit big + -0.054 -1.31 -0.011 -0.21
Log L -6722.4 -6270.9 -6530.5 -6270.8
Estimated probabilities
Contraction 0.407 0.408 0.407 0.408
Zero changes 0.207 0.207 0.206 0.207
Expansion 0.386 0.385 0.386 0.385
OLS w/ inverse Mills ratios
Contraction
delta - 0.329 8.44 0.133 13.81 0.291 7.89 0.128 10.66
empl. big - -0.056 -4.17 0.005 0.77
h tilde - 0.084 3.05 -0.071 -12.01 0.061 2.17 -0.075 -9.18
Expansion
delta + 0.203 4.33 0.346 8.26 0.230 5.19 0.316 7.65
empl. big + -0.090 -9.50 -0.090 -9.54
h tilde + -0.068 -1.13 -0.279 -4.89 -0.089 -1.53 -0.221 -3.90
Maximum likelihood
(S/K)it-1 0.056 6.30 0.056 6.28 0.058 6.53 0.058 6.50
(S/K)it-2 -0.025 -2.86 -0.025 -2.84 -0.025 -2.76 -0.025 -2.75
w it-1 -0.249 -3.82 -0.251 -3.85 -0.254 -3.89 -0.254 -3.89
w it-2 0.274 4.05 0.273 4.03 0.270 3.99 0.270 4.00
d tilde - 4.181 1.93 3.972 0.61 4.112 2.16 3.577 1.08
d tilde + 4.557 1.82 4.355 0.68 4.420 2.30 4.005 1.28
h tilde - -0.162 -25.35 -0.162 -25.28 -0.172 -26.88 -0.172 -26.93
h tilde + 0.158 13.56 0.159 13.63 0.179 15.50 0.179 15.52
g tilde - 5.296 0.06 4.421 0.12
g tilde + 4.200 0.05 2.903 0.09
probit big -0 . 1 9 2 0.01 0.347 0.04
probit big +0 . 2 5 2 0.01 0.342 0.03
empl. big - 0.039 8.95 0.039 8.10
empl. big + -0.101 -10.62 -0.101 -10.65
delta - 0.109 72.53 0.109 72.46 0.108 72.45 0.108 72.52
delta + 0.193 70.60 0.193 70.61 0.189 70.59 0.189 70.65
Log L 2643.1 2643.1 2731.3 2731.2
Number of obs 6439 6439 6439 6439